Novità - News


Il Dipartimento di Politica Economica, Finanza e Sviluppo  (DEPFID) termina la sua attività il 31 ottobre 2012

Su questo sito web restano consultabili la serie dei DEPFID Working Papers e le informazioni sulla attività svolta dal Dipartimento dal 2006 al 2012



Home Working Papers



DEPFID Working Paper 9 / 2009 - Abstract


Self-serving biased reference points

Andrea Gallice

The paper formalizes the pervasive phenomenon of the self-serving bias within the framework of reference dependent preferences. This formulation allows to state a simple rule to assess the existence of the bias at the aggregate level as well as a procedure that identifies the minimum number of biased agents. As an application, we study the problem of the optimal allocation of a scarce resource among a finite number of claimants. We analyze the performance of different welfare criteria and show how the existence of self-serving biased individuals exacerbates the conflict between equity and efficiency of the final allocation.

KEYWORDS: Self-Serving Bias, Reference Dependent Preferences, Optimal Allocation.
Questo indirizzo e-mail è protetto dallo spam bot. Abilita Javascript per vederlo.

Download fulltext